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Let me first briefly run over how the present role arose - 
the transition from the colonial to the neo-colonial system 
(or rather from a group of colonial systems to two neo­
colonial systems, dominated by the United States and the 
Soviet Union respectively).
In the first decade after the end of the war, when the 
globe was divided into three 'worlds', this corresponded 
to reality. The centrally planned countries were ruled by 
Communist Parties which obediently followed the lead of their 
comrades in Moscow, and had characteristically different 
economic systems, in which each production unit was assigned 
an annual target.
In the rest of the world, the profit motive still reigned, 
but two distinct groups could be identified. One was a great 
deal richer than the other: too much has been made of
comparisons in per capita incomes, but there was little doubt 
about the contrast if one looked at dimensions such as degree 
of industrialization, reliance on exports of primary products, 
fiscal systems, and sources of technology, let alone such 
social indicators on literacy, mortality, etc., as were 
available.
Besides, many of the developed countries were still imperial 
powers, even if their empires were crumbling, and nearly all 
those who were developing (then called by the less flattering
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term 'underdeveloped') had been colonies, the majority in fact 
until very recently. Rarely explicit in diplomatic fora was 
an underlying perception in both camps that the great majority 
in the developed countries were white, of European stock, 
whereas the great majority in the other group (with the 
conspicuous exception of the Southern Cone of Latin America) 
were not.
This frame for looking at the world has been until now curiously 
convenient for the governments of each type of country. Its 
usefulness to the elites ruling the developing countries does 
not need spelling out: it created the presumption that they
would receive concessions in trade, etc., and in particular, 
large quantities of resources would be passed to them as aid.
Not merely would they be able to use some of this themselves: 
they would be able to dispense it as patronage.
Secondly, the framework separated the Soviet government and 
its East European allies from the rest of Europe, and relieved 
them from the responsibility of making such transfers themselves - 
but allowed them to continue criticizing the 'imperialist powers' 
as exploiters.
What is superficially somewhat surprising is that there was 
widespread acceptance of such a perceptual frame in the 
developed countries too. But it suited powerful interests.
Naturally it was convenient for foreign offices: it justified
parliamentary appropriations that helped to save the ex-colonies 
from the Soviet domination. Emerging TNCs (Transnational Corporations)not only 
- S J ^ e e p  open the non-socialist world economy (which can without 
dogma be called 'neocolonial'), they were glad there was some 
other source of capital and technical assistance to create 
the schools, roads, power plants, etc., necessary for their 
activities.
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Yet this also provided a moral programme for European liberals 
and socialists, who were keen to purge themselves of guilt 
about both the colonial past and the inequalities of the 
present. Instead it gave them a stage for a world role - 
a version, though much diminished, of the part that their 
forefathers (the 'liberal imperialists') could play in the 
days of empire. Many of the heads of state of former colonies, 
notably Nehru, later Nyerere, for example, were well-known 
in Europe: they were seen as socialists in the West European
tradition, who would respect democratic rights. Inequalities 
overseas were gross indeed (reflecting in part the pay structure 
inherited from the colonial services), but they would soon be 
reduced, as they had been in Europe.
This extraordinary international coalition (the political 
breadth of which must be historically unique) included a part 
of academia. Some social scientists, economists in particular, 
in both developed and developing countries, showed the govern­
ments of the developing countries how to 'plan' growth.
The third quarter of this century was the heyday of the well- 
intentioned intervener, abroad as well as at home: the
'scientific' approach to social problems was in the ascendant. 
Social problems only had to be properly specified and analysed 
for them to be solved. In particular, research based on 
imported analytical techniques, could help to raise the 
economic and social levels in developing countries to those 
in the developed countries, which were seen as basically 
satisfactory. A cosy philosophy of internationalism reinforced 
modernization. There were ultimately no unmanageable conflicts 
of interest within or between countries; in the ever-expanding 
world made possible by scientific discoveries, all could 
advance - those furthest behind, indeed, the quickest. The 
only obstacles were the cultural traditions that (temporarily) 
stood in the way of progress, especially nationalism, militarism, 
and philoprogenitive inclinations.
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Events have been undermining the three-world classification, 
the basis of this way of perceiving world problems. The 
categories of developed and developing countries have been 
becoming more heterogeneous and thus now overlap, whatever 
dimensions one looks at. The per capita income of some 
developing countries, e g Abu Dhabi, is now higher than that 
of the USA, and Singapore is more urbanised than most of 
Western Europe. Indeed, Japan has leapt from underdeveloped 
to highly developed; Argentina and Brazil have become in 
many economic dimensions, including technological capacity, 
more developed than Greece or Portugal.
There has also been some convergence between the systems of 
the capitalist and socialist countries. The former, both 
developed and developing, have been showing gradual central­
isation of economic and political power and growing public 
sectors, despite temporary periods of 'denationalisation' in 
Britain and the USA, whereas the socialist countries are 
becoming - in varying degrees - decentralized, as well as 
increasingly dependent on imported capital and technology. 
Hungary is a conspicuous example; China, Algeria and Yugoslavia 
have been anomalies for some time, hard to fit into any of the 
three official categories, and the same is now true of Roumania.
The second major change has been political. Whereas in the 
first decades after independence at least the forms of 
parliamentary democracy were mostly preserved - and they 
flourished in parts of Latin America, for example Chile - 
the characteristic government of developing countries is now 
dictatorship, sometimes civilian, but mostly military, and 
in any case repressive, often savagely so. (See Table 1).
As far as one can tell, inequalities have become greater: 
in many countries the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
are little better off, if indeed there has been any improvement 
at all (except in the reduced prevalence of a few endemic 
diseases), whereas the elites have been adapting their life­
style to the rising standards of their counterparts in the
f Table r a/ .Military-dominated governments in developing
c o u n t r i e s b y  continent,and their 
and loans, 1980
support by aid
Moderate to , Heavy : 
high aid' debtor d/
Moderate to Heavy 
high aid debtor
Latin 
America (12)
•
Africa (20)
Argentina X Algeria X
Bolivia X X
Brazil X Benin . X
Chile X Burundi X
El Salvador X Cameroon X
Guatemala Central Afr Rep X
Haiti X Chad
Honduras X Congo X
Nicaragua X X Eq Guinea
Panama X X Liberia X
Paraguay X Madagascar X
Uruguay X Mali X
Asia (10)
Bangladesh
Burma
Indonesia
Jordan
.Korea
Pakistan
Philippines
Taiwan
X -■
X
X
X
X
X
Mauretania
Niger
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
X
X
X
X
X X 
X
X
X X
Thailand •
Turkey X X
Source: Country classification, World Militarv and Social Exoenditures, 1981,
by Ruth Siva-d (World Priorities, Leesburg, Va).
Aid, Deveiocment Corporation: 1981 Review (Cevelconent Assistance
. Committee, OECD, Paris) . 
Population, debt service and 
(World 3ank, Washington).
exports: World Cevelccment Retort 1982
a/ So-classed 
b/ Other than
in the source. Those af: 
these affiliated to the
dilated to the Scvi 
socialist bloc.
.at bloc are excluded here.
c/ Aid net receipts .tore than 312 ter cacita. 
d/ Service on public and cubli 
of gcccs and 5010/1035.
ar.teed debt core than 1C% cf value retorts
rindustrial countries (with the additional advantage of cheap 
domestic services and, in many countries, cheap petrol).
Corruption has become rampant (it exists in various forms in 
the developed countries, of course, but financial corruption 
is relatively on a much smaller scale than in parts of the 
Third World).
A programme for reviving the neo-colonial system, such as 
the New International Economic Order, would help them maintain 
this lifestyle and their political control, but it no longer 
has much moral content. (It would doubtless benefit some of 
the poor, too, but at the cost of perpetuating their subjugation).
So academic progressives have become disillusioned, and the 
old coalition has been undermined. Moreover, few in the 
developed countries any longer see their own societies as 
sufficiently successful either to act as a model or to provide 
great quantities of resources to help the rest of the world.
The framework is still useful to those with political and 
commercial motives for subsidizing the governments of 
developing countries. Indeed, there is now an additional 
justification - many private banks have lent heavily abroad 
and are worried about the prospects of the debts being 
serviced, let alone repaid. A more general argument (e g 
in the Brandt Report) is that rising incomes in the South 
would help reflate the economies of the North: but if the
'Northern' governments wanted a boom (some of them seem far 
from keen), they could manage it much more efficiently by 
increasing their domestic expenditures. The result of a 
worldwide reflation might well be to reveal the oil and food 
shortages that lurk near the surface, and could generate a 
politically embarrassing return of inflation. Moreover, if aid 
were massively increased, its suppliers might not all gain 
trade correspondingly - Britain, in particular, might lose 
out.
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Yet, large-scale aid may not be a necessary price to keep the 
neo-colonial system alive. The Soviet Union has evidently 
become less influential in the world scene: it no longer has
much oil to offer, even to its Communist partners. Besides, 
the survival of the system seems unlikely to continue being 
in the interests of many in the industrial countries, who 
find it means heavy outflows of capital, growing volumes of 
imports of manufactures (See Table 2), and increasing 
competition in the world market.
The best survival policy for Western Europe, Britain in 
particular, lies in strengthening and further enlarging the 
European Community, though to make this viable will require a 
development strategy with many dimensions, as yet hardly touched 
on in Community politics, especially industrial and redistrib­
utive (to integrate the new members properly), but also in the 
fields of education and population (e g stimulating a mild 
population growth, so as to raise the ratio of teenagers to 
pensioners).
Within the Third World there are two-contrary pressures: one
is for a Brandt-type programme of increased aid and trade 
concessions and the other for increased self-reliance.
They are incompatible because aid is an instrument of control 
to keep economies more firmly tied to the international 
financial system, which of course is even more obviously true 
of schemes to stabilise commodity prices, allow trade 
preferences, etc.
The two programmes thus correspond to the interests of different
1 /classes in the South. The bureaucrats and those with
professional skills have had their minds moulded in part by 
foreign education (or education based on imported textbooks). 
They favour the 'most up-to-date' technology, believe in 
quantitative development plans, h< ve living standards depending 
on imports (cars, colour television, video recorders, etc).
Aid programmes give them not only opportunities of corruption
BALANCE OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURES^: EEC (9) AND UZ- WITH REST OF TORLI
1960:TO 1980
Ecu. bn. EEC (9) of which UK
IMPORTS EXPORTS RATIO
X/M
IMPORTS EXPORTS RATIC
X/M
1960 8.4 21.5 2.6 2.8 6.9 2.5
1965 13.2 29.1 2.2 4.3 8.5 2.0
1970 25.1 47.6 1.8 7.5 11.8 1.6
1975 48.8 103.1 2.1 13.4 20.6 1.5
1980 118.7 183.0 1.5 30.4 38.7 1.3
Notes: (a) S.I.T.C. groups 5 to 8, viz. Chemicals, Manufactured Goods
classified by material, Machinery and Transport Equipment, 
Other manufactured goods.
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities (1981),
Monthly External Tfade Bulletin, Special Number,1958-80 
(Luxembourg).
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and possibilities of patronage but also often their only 
chance of foreign travel. Thus they favour strengthening 
the neo-colonial system, as of course do most of those in 
the export and import trades.
Many in the Third World secretly welcome the tough conditions 
imposed by the IMF and bilateral donors which rule out import 
controls, etc. and the 'monetarist' policies that are the 
natural correlates of this approach which imply stiff 
opposition to wage increases.
Local capitalists producing for the home market, however, 
naturally favour a programme of import substitution using 
high tariffs, import and exchange controls, etc., and so do 
most of their workers. Indeed the representative workers in 
other sectors often favour autonomous policies, precisely 
because 'opening up' the economy would mean limits on government 
social expenditures, wage control, etc.
I have over-simplified. Somebody in the Third World in favour 
of strengthening the world system may well favour redistributing 
the income that it provides - for example, changing the voting 
structure of the IMF and the World Bank, and by this or other 
means issuing SDRs only to the governments of the Third World. 
Conversely, those who favour opting out of the system may 
well have doubts about the possibility and cost of doing so: 
such fears may be well-founded.
As Western Europe develops its resource base (even just the 
12) the customary interventions of its member governments in 
the political and economic affairs of other countries, which 
is certainly becoming less feasible, should be less necessary. 
This, together with the effects of the economic expansion 
of the Community that would be feasible could be much more 
important to most of the Third World than what happened to 
the volume of aid and other capit; 1 flows, or to trade barriers 
on manufactures. Indeed, import controls on industrial
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products would be consistent with an expansion of imports 
of many types of primary product.
It could well be to the benefit of all parties if the European 
TNCs engaged in manufacturing and mining were induced to invest 
inside the Community, especially along its periphery, rather 
than outside it. Governments elsewhere are much less capable 
of rejecting economically or socially undesirable projects put 
forward by the TNCs, or of monitoring their operations (e g 
by checking 'transfer pricing1), or of ensuring that technology 
of the right kind is gained.
Thus what appears to be a Eurocentric scenario could be 
beneficial to much of the Third World, at least in the longer 
run. It would not be hard to improve on past performance.
Our contribution to overseas development may well have been on 
balance negative, even since decolonisation. The impact 
varies, of course, but in general high technology is injected 
into the 'modern sector', aggravating geographical dualism 
and economic inequality. The beneficial effects of aid, on 
some parts of the recipient population, have often been 
outweighed by the consequences of political support for 
governments that fit into the neo-colonial system. A good 
deal of European capital and covert political support has
been extended to the government of South Africa, affecting
2 /the whole of the southern part of the continent.
Now that the neo-colonial system is disintegrating, the most 
constructive European policy in the 1980s would be to adopt 
less paternalistic policies to the Third World. One of the 
most significant implications of the second enlargement of 
the EEC is that it permits, and may compel, a degree of 
disengagement, including a running down of aid programmes 
in the South.
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Types of aid that have primarily political or commercial 
justifications (constituting now a large fraction of the 
total) could well be reduced, with advantage to both sides. 
This does not imply its sharp and total elimination: while
that would reduce the incomes of many who live off corruption 
and high distribution margins, and reduce the patronage of 
military cliques, it would also hurt some of the really poor. 
Aid targets are really meaningless (because aid covers so 
many sins), but an aim of letting it decline to about 0.1 
per cent of donors' GNP by the end of the century would 
concentrate the minds of the policy-makers and may be the 
sort of magnitude that would be consistent with the scenario 
I am outlining.
There is a growing demand for 'self-reliance1 in the Third 
World. Our correct response is to respect this, and - so 
far as we can - reduce, not increase, our contacts. Self­
reliance in the South logically implies self-reliance in the 
North too. If we could give up the temptation to meddle in 
the affairs of overseas countries - a meddling that, in fact, 
is often counter-productive - we would certainly save on 
military expenditures as well as aid budgets, and need to make 
fewer trade concessions.
It might well be argued that some North-South contacts are 
beneficial - even that they offset the damage done by political 
and cultural interventions by the greater powers. Thus 
European (and for that matter United States) priests and nuns 
have done a great deal in Latin America, politically as well 
as socially, to offset the financial and military aid given to 
the dictatorships and the commercial loans. It would also be 
possible to argue that economic advice that counters what is, 
for example, given by European monetarists (or Marxists) is 
only making good the damage done by other Europeans or Americans - 
the same could be said about some of our theoretical contrib­
utions to the 'development' debate.
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The trouble with justifications of intervention is, however, 
that they can be used by those who want to strengthen the 
neo-colonial system for their own reasons. Besides, more 
basically, who are we to judge what is, and what is not, a 
justifiable intervention? - we really lack the knowledge, 
no less than the right, to do this.
I make one major exception, however, in favour of human rights. 
There is little doubt that outside intervention, whether in 
the form of resolutions, deputations or letters, has some 
influence in encouraging the application of proper legal 
process to political prisoners. If one can do anything to 
lessen, even marginally, the torture, inhumane imprisonment 
and execution of people for political reasons (often personal 
vendettas), in the countries listed in Table 1, then the 
obligation to do this seems to me to over-ride the arguments 
against intervention in the affairs of other countries, 
especially since the administrations that behave in this way 
often depend on exports from Europe.
The Community could also itself play a positive role in 
establishing a more durable world economic order, with 
international taxation gradually taking the place of aid, 
and expenditures based on criteria such as infant mortality 
rates (perhaps tied to basic health care). (Admittedly, 
many dictatorships would automatically benefit - but they 
would not receive aid because they adopted policies conducive 
to the survival of the neo-colonial system). Europe would 
certainly gain from a stable international system, even if 
it were less colonial.
I will close by speculating on what sort of a world system 
might replace the neo-colonial one. Europe may prove to 
be the first of a series of regional blocs. While the world 
crises encourage self-sufficiency, this can hardly be 
achieved on a national basis, ind< J this is more implausible
roverseas than in Europe. Only a handful of the nation states have 
markets frig enough for manufactures such as aircraft: the United
- States and the Soviet Union are leading examples, though 
India and China could well join them in the 21st century.
It is uncertain whether Europe (even its Western part) will 
develop in this way. Elsewhere it is even more problematic, 
and for the same basic reasons. The links within them are 
so far mostly economic. They are each even more lopsided 
than the Community, consisting essentially of a weak ring 
around a highly advanced core. The industrial core of the 
Latin American region is Brazil and Argentina (with Mexico a 
separate base to the North); of East Asia, Japan; of the 
South Pacific, Australia. There are colonial-type relations 
between each regional core and its periphery: the core sells
advanced manufactures and takes in less sophisticated products, 
foodstuffs, and raw materials. There are also strong labour 
flows towards the centre to work in its factories; and tourist 
flows mainly in the opposite direction, just as in Europe.
Indeed, the balance of payments of the periphery is heavily
dependent on remittances from migrants working in the factories
3 /of the core and on tourist expenditures. '
While the big nation-states have some political machinery for 
integration, the other regional groups, by contrast, have 
fewer means than the Community of overcoming these disparities, 
e g by transferring to the periphery the profits of core 
manufacturing operations (and also financial and transport 
institutions with headquarters in core countries). Regional 
banks provide some capital on concessional terms, but very 
little in relation to needs. The UN has Regional Commissions, 
but they do not fit the regional economic patterns; their 
powers are limited; and their coverage is too big. (Even 
the Latin American Commission includes the United States as 
well as Britain and France). The responsibility for aid 
programmes to the governments that alleviate poverty in each 
area best lies in its Own rich countries - they have some 
long-term interest in doing so.
- 1 1 -
- 1 2 -
A region like Latin America trades more with the outside 
world than they would need to if their resources were 
properly developed, and internal exchanges developed. Much of 
the capital generated in some regions, again Latin America is 
an example, flows elsewhere (whereas many governments in the 
same regions have to borrow, usually expensively, from outside).
All regions also lack (again with the partial exception of the 
two European systems) collective representation in international 
affairs. There are regional political organizations, such as 
the Organisation of American States and the Organisation of 
African Unity, but they hardly fulfil this role. (The former 
includes the United States). Finally, there are no effective 
common defence arrangements (except for each of the two Europes, 
and even also these include outside powers).
Such weaknesses may well be overcome if the economic pressures 
continue to grow and great power policies become increasingly 
threatening. There are already a few indications of progress 
in this direction, apart from those already mentioned in 
connection with Europe. Aid programmes of the oil exporters 
of the Middle East show a concentration on neighbouring 
countries, and Mexico, together with Venezuela, has arranged 
to supply cheap oil to countries in the Caribbean.
In the 1960s there had been an increase in the intra-regional 
trade for developing countries big enough to raise its share 
in total trade. This accelerated in the 1970s: if we
consider non-fuel products (since fuel trade has been 
relatively small within regions), there was a rise in 
intra-regional trade between 1970 and 1979, from 15 per cent 
to 20 per cent of total developing country exports.^
As one example of institutional development, a Latin American 
organization for regional cooper, tion has emerged without US 
membership*- SELA, based in Caracas, working on food self­
sufficiency and energy development.
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But regional blocs will only be viable in the long run if 
they show some cultural cohesion - in terms of common ethnic 
origins, language, customs, and historical experience - at 
least enough to be able to 'communicate' despite linguistic 
differences (so that the members understand each other's 
problems).
I have neither the space nor the knowledge to discuss what would 
be the appropriate membership for regional systems in other 
parts of the world,-still less how they ought to be organized. 
Indeed, it would be an impertinence for me to do so - the 
usual impertinence of the citizen of a former colonial power 
trying to arrange the affairs of other people. Those blocs 
that have a realistic basis will appear and shape themselves. 
They may be quite different from the existing regional systems 
of trade.•
What a European can say, however, is that it will be costly for 
all parties if we fail to grasp the logic of these trends, 
and try to preserve the neo-colonial system by political 
or military intervention or by aid programmes (or some 
combination of these, as is usually the case) - just as 
expensive as the failure of some to recognize, earlier in the 
century, the breakdown of colonialism. (The temptations 
for such intervention may be considerable).
A system of large regional economies, with a minimum of 200 
million people, would be more symmetrical, even if not 
completely so: none would dominate, though some would be
stronger than others. It should be more stable. There is 
no certainty about this - one could imagine (as in Orwell's 
1984) war between such blocs, perhaps between alliances of 
them - but I would certainly feel more confident that, if 
such a system emerges, children in Europe will grow up to 
be adults.
DS/BMT
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